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In our lives we are used to face situations in which
something we all desire depends on the coordinated action
of our peers. If we were to solve the practical problem of
what to do in these situations from scratch, our daily life
would be constantly at risk or even impossible. Luckily
enough social life is full of patterns that we are able to
discern in order to predict what the others will do, and that,
at the same time, give us reasons to keep behaving as we
have done before. Some of such regularities are what we
call conventions, and to this ‘to`pos’ this special issue is
devoted.
But, what makes a social regularity into a convention?
It has been 40 years since the first publication of David
Lewis’ seminal essay on this topic (Lewis 1969), and his
book has proved to be a source of inspiration for many
practitioners in different fields. Lewis’ theory was devel-
oped as a response to Quine’s attack at the notion of
analyticity in philosophy of language, and was intended
also as a unifying approach to the study of ‘languages’ as
formal semantic models, and ‘language’ as a historical and
social phenomenon. Intuitively, it is by convention that a
population uses a certain language instead of another. But
to clarify this platitude, one needs a theory of what a
convention is.
The relevance of a theory of conventions of course spans
well beyond the study of language. Language, in fact, is
just one among many activities that are governed by con-
ventions. Conventional regularities can be found at the core
of morality, law, economics and in practically any of the
daily activities we engage in. Nonetheless, a shared view
on this issue is still missing.
Notoriously, Lewis took advantage of game theory to
approach the problem, and in doing so he also innovated
game theory itself in ways that are nowadays being redis-
covered (Cubitt and Sugden 2003). However, from the
onset he also advised the reader that game theory was
scaffolding, and he showed this to be true in his rejoinder
to the problem few years after his first take (see Lewis
1975). In any case, the basic theoretical proposal was
preserved so that conventions of a population of agents
turned to be regularities in action (or alternatively in action
and belief) which are arbitrary but perpetuate themselves
because they serve some sort of common interest. Past
conformity to such regularity gives everyone a reason to go
on conforming in the present instance, so that the regularity
is constantly re-produced. However, an alternative regu-
larity would have been maintained in the same way if
everybody conformed to it in the first place.
This concise formulation, of course, hides many of the
difficulties that need to be accounted for to fully understand
the phenomenon. Nothing is said on how a specific con-
vention originates in the first place (what is the appropriate
evolutionary dynamics of a certain regularity of behavior?),
on how the agents coordinate their private representations
on the salient pattern to follow (what is the correct pattern
between the many apt to describe the regularity? how does
it happen that all agents in a population share the same
representation of the situation and the regularity to fol-
low?), of how much and what kind of knowledge of the
convention each agent needs to dispose in order to conform
(do conventions really need to be matter of common
knowledge?), on the kind of reasoning, if any, that the
agents endorse in order to decide to conform (is conformity
to a convention justified by reasoning or do we conform
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just out of habit? is there any specific reasoning behind the
sort of joint actions that are typically the object of con-
ventions?), on whether or not conformity to a convention is
something which we ought to do even beyond our self-
interest (are conventions a species of norms? are norms just
nothing more than conventions?).
Answering all these questions calls for the contribution of
many different disciplines, from many areas of philosophy
(philosophy of sociality, moral philosophy, philosophy of
action, of mind, of language, of law, and logic) to several
between the behavioral and the social sciences (cognitive
science, linguistics, economics, anthropology and sociol-
ogy). This is reflected in the rationale of this special issue,
where each of the eleven contributions approaches the
notion of convention from different perspectives, both the-
oretical and applicative, addressing distinct problems with a
variety of methodologies.
Although, as the title intends to suggest, the special issue
is partially in homage to Lewis’ classic, each of the authors
deals with the topic with his/her own specific twist and
background, offering a new and critical assessment of
Lewis’ theory and of its range of application.
Gilbert for instance challenges the individualism on
which the game theoretical account of conventions is
founded, and contrasts Lewis’ analysis with her own
holistic account which is grounded in Durkheim’s socio-
logical tradition. Differently, as an economist, Binmore is
concerned with the role of common knowledge for the
establishment of conventions. Lewis, who first introduced
the concept, made it part of the very definition of con-
ventions. Unfortunately, Binmore argues, by adopting the
standard formal model of common knowledge accepted by
economists (Aumann 1976), such an appeal to common
knowledge has the consequence that new conventions
could not get started in large societies. If one wants to
understand how conventions originate, ‘evolutive’ game
theory is the correct approach to the problem. If, differ-
ently, as Sillari in the next contribution, one is interested in
the epistemic justification of the agents’ reason to conform
to the prevailing conventional regularities, then the appeal
to common knowledge still proves to be useful. Especially
if one carefully reconstructs the peculiar way in which
Lewis defined the concept, which, while having been too
quickly dismissed (but see Clark 1996 and Cubitt and
Sugden 2003), is still original and fruitful. Postema goes
even further, and argues that the stock of common
knowledge, which he reconstructs as a kind of ‘experiential
commons’, is the common ground from which the agents
reason adopting a non-standard form of practical reason-
ing: ‘salience’ reasoning. Such reasoning is seen in a non
individualistic way proceeding from the first-person plural,
where salience ‘for us’ can be detected, to the best decision
for all the interacting agents. Pulling various strings
together, Ross also considers Lewis’ account as individu-
alist in a problematic way. Offering a game theoretical
reconstruction of both Gilbert’s and Postema’s critiques, he
sets himself to show that such problematic individualism is
not due to the formal apparatus used to explore strategic
interaction. Standing with Binmore, he agrees that the
origins of conventional regularities are better captured by
evolutionary arguments. However, he also contends that
the agents still have reasons to conform to such regulari-
ties, at least if one, as Ross suggests, is able to model
people not as plain economic agents but as complex
products of a socialization dynamics.
The next three articles explore the power and limits of
various aspects of Lewis’ notion of convention, to
enlighten problems in particular domains. Verbeek defends
at length the relevance of a ‘conventionalist’ analysis of
moral norms, or at least of some of them. Moral norms
seem to lack the property of arbitrariness that is typical of
conventions. For this reason, many moral philosophers
reject any analysis along these lines. However, Verbeek
argues that the resources of the conventionalist approach
can resist many objections of this sort, even if in the end
some aspects of the theory must be corrected. Differently,
both Millikan and Marmor revive the study of convention
and language. Millikan focuses on the way linguistic
conventions are spread. Lewis has suggested that the use
and understanding of language involves the perception of
new coordination problems as being like old ones: solvable
with analogous linguistic tools. Millikan shows in details
that such suggestion fits well with contemporary theories of
language acquisition and change held by construction
grammars (for an explicit link, see Croft 2000). Marmor,
like Gilbert and Millikan, contrasts his own theory of
conventions with Lewis, in order to challenge the classical
view that the literal meaning of words is conventionally
fixed. While conventions can specify borderline cases and
include them into the extension under certain conditions,
the use of a word is governed by norms and not by con-
ventions on Marmor’s analysis.
Finally, the last three contributions, again from different
perspectives, raise a concern that echoes those investigated
by Gilbert, Binmore, Postema and Ross: the problem of
creating an ‘intersubjective’ space between the agents, in
which their mental representations, and not only their overt
behaviors, are coordinated. Favereau contrasts the two
definition of convention provided by Lewis in his two
publications on the topic (Lewis 1969, 1975), noting that
the second is less widely acknowledged in the literature
than the first. While originally Lewis treated conventions as
regularities in action alone, he then revised his analysis and
generalized it to cover also regularities in action and belief,
which seem to better characterize the conventions of lan-
guage he was primarily interested in. Favereau argues that
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this shift has more radical consequences than usually
assumed because it implicitly puts forward a different
conception of rationality: interpretive rationality. This form
of rationality is at odds with the calculative one, which, in
the end, is unable to cope with the collective perspective
that agents adopt in their social interactions. Alterman,
from the viewpoint of contemporary cognitive science,
argues that in everyday activity agents must somehow
‘agree’ on which recurrent situation they are facing
and which is the relevant regularity to follow: both the
‘situation’ and the ‘regularity’ always vary, but their rep-
resentations need to be coordinated. Such problems are
particularly demanding when developing computational
models in which conventions do not have a fixed structure,
but emerge during the unfolding of collaborative activities.
In a similar vein, but adopting an ‘interactivist’ approach
inspired by Piaget developmental psychology (Piaget
1954), Bickhard shows some basic defects of the belief-
desire propositional framework championed by Lewis,
especially in dealing with the characteristic normativity of
conventions (an issue raised also by Gilbert). The notion of
convention that Bickhard defends is in terms of a joint
interactive representation of a social situation: this makes it
possible to ground the normativity of conventions in the
implicit relations among the participants and offers a per-
spective to connect it to the more complex social ontology
that we, as humans, are able to construct.
Even from a bird’s eye view, these contributions show
how fruitful an interdisciplinary study of conventions is.
The tension between individualistic and collectivistic
perspectives, the mediating role of intersubjectivity and
common knowledge, the appeal to salience and normativity
are themselves ‘topoi’ which recurrently emerge in all
contemporary reflections on the nature of our social reality,
and that, I hope, this special issue help to cast in a common
framework.
Finally, though conventional, it is nonetheless sincere my
deep acknowledgment of the help received by the journal
associate editor, Fabio Paglieri, whom I thank for his never-
ending patience and precision, together with the many
reviewers who all have enthusiastically accepted to assist me
in the assessment of the contributions, and the authors that
have shared with me the vision of this special issue.
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